

Human Ethology Newsletter

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Newsletter Submissions
Anything which might be of interest to ISHE members is welcome: society matters, suggestions for Forum topics, Growing Points, Mini Communications, Current literature and films, and material for the Bulletin Board such as announcements of meetings, sabbatical opportunities, employment opportunities, etc., should be sent to the Editor.

Suggestions for books to review, or reviews, should be sent to the nearest Book Review Editor dealing with the language concerned. A list of the book review editors is printed in the column inside the backpage.

Submissions in any legible format are acceptable as long as these are in English. Floppy disks containing Wordperfect files produced on an IBM-PC (compatible), or ASCII files can be processed as well and are in fact preferred, because they lower the production costs.

Submission deadlines are as follows: the material should have reached the editor in Amsterdam before February 15, May 15, August 15, or November 15 for inclusion in the next issue of March, June, September, or December respectively.

Publishing Policy

No material in the Newsletter is selected by critical peer review and thus material is printed only to foster free and creative exchange of (even outrageous) ideas between researchers. The fact that material appears in the Newsletter never implies the truth of those ideas, ISHE's support of them, nor any support for any policy implications that one might be able to draw from them.

SOCIETY MATTERS

ISHE Meeting during the ABS Conference of 10-15 June 1990 at SUNY, Binghamton, New York, U.S.A.

The ABS gave us a special privilege to hold a symposium and have single papers on Human Ethology during their 1990 meeting. Each presentation lasts 20 minutes. The Animal Behavior Society Program Officer and the Secretary of ISHE will compose the contributions into one and a half day of concentrated Human Ethology papers.

The yearly ISHE business meeting will also be held during this ABS conference. The conference is scheduled for Thursday evening, June 14 and Friday morning June 15. The registration form is enclosed in this newsletter (pages 4-5). For further conference information contact:

Dr. Stim Wilcox
Dept. of Biological Science
SUNY, Binghamton,
NY 13901, U.S.A.
tel.: (607) 7772423

Dues revisited

In the circular sent in January on the forthcoming meeting and raise of dues some information in the latter was incorrect. Direct payment from bank to bank outside of the U.S.A. is NOT free of charge any more and seems to be Dfl. 12. So the only way of payment without these horrendous bank charges is by means of an Euro-cheque. International giro payment costs about the same as payment from bank to bank. If you have no other option but to pay with a cheque, Dfl. 10.— is to be added on top of the regular dues. Cheques addressed to the treasurer Herman Dienske should be in Dutch Guilders (Dfl.). Members from the U.S.A. should send their U.S. personal checks to Jay Feierman. Detailed instructions for payment are given on the last page of each newsletter.

Dues are Dfl. 100 (or \$50) for three years or Dfl. 40 (\$20) for a single year.

FORUM

It's the Most Complete Knowledge That's Most Responsible

by: William R. Charlesworth, Institute of Child Development, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455, U.S.A.

The Dec. 1989 issue of the *Newsletter* raises once again the old problem of the uses and misuses of scientific knowledge. In dealing with this problem, I think we should keep two things in mind: (1) the more complete our knowledge, the more it approaches the truth of the empirical phenomenon it depicts, and (2) the more truthful this depiction, the more socially responsible the knowledge is because it gives those who use it the most information upon which to base their decisions.

The social problem Rushton's work posed is obviously great. But his work does not, in this respect, stand alone. Other scientific belief systems about crucial determinants of human behavior can also pose serious social risks — much less obvious, perhaps, as Rushton's, but just as potentially dangerous. Environmentalism is one such belief system.

Those concerned about the use of scientific knowledge involving genetic determinants of human behavior should, in my estimation, be as equally concerned about the use of scientific knowledge about environmental determinants. Misusing such knowledge is a daily occurrence. Advertisers, editorialists, cartoonists, propagandists, political campaigners, one-issue fanatics, ideologues, torturers, and terrorists — know well how environmental stimuli can be used to control human behavior. In a recent documentary film on the training of torturers during the last Greek dictatorship, standard Pavlovian and Skinnerian techniques were used. Yet no one to my knowledge held these two eminent scientists responsible. For almost a century, psychologists have been steadily supplying society with a wide range of effective methods to change people's behavior, habits, and attitudes.

At the more philosophical level, environmental determinists (going back to at least Locke and Rousseau) have successfully shaped many Westerners into believing in the virtually unlimited plasticity of human behavior. Such beliefs have profoundly affected our educational systems as well the socialization of our children. While much of the environmentalist agenda has served positive uses, it has also been misused in very inhumane ways.

Of course, there is no easy way to prove that a scientific belief system is directly responsible for the misuse of the knowledge it generates. We can only assume such causality on a case by case basis. Given many pieces of converging evidence, such assumptions can often be very reasonable. Grammer and Stockl's (1989) point that Gobineau's theories led to Nazi race laws is a good example.

Learning researchers, however, are not the only ones that lend support to environmentalist thinking. Developmental psychologists, starting at least with Freud and Bowlby, have (with and without the help of ethologists) supplied society with convincing evidence of the power of early experiences in shaping later social behavior and motivation. For example, there is a substantial research literature linking instances of sociopathy, delinquency, and criminality to early childhood abuse and neglect. Dictators have long known where to recruit people to do

their dirty work. Data give scientific credibility to the efficacy of their techniques. The recent, now defunct, Rumanian dictatorship, for example, allegedly recruited boys brought up in orphanages to serve in its security forces. While orphanages are obviously not instituted to be training grounds of later sociopaths, the frequent lack of warm personal contact and individual attention characterizing many of them hardly helps in developing social, responsible individuals. Actually, ideas about the potency of early experience in shaping human behavior have long antedated modern psychology. Ancient Sparta was skilled in developing early socialization techniques to create a ruthless class of warriors (MacDonald, 1988).

To my knowledge, sociologists of science have not yet seriously examined the sociopolitical implications of scientific knowledge about the plasticity of human behavior and the powerful role early environment plays in setting adult behavior into deep channels of habit. Nor have scholars seriously expressed concern for the implications for human welfare and happiness of political ideologies that claim that human misery is caused by a few social/environmental structures that condition all human experience. Marx's claim, for example, that human happiness ultimately rests on the means of production has for decades captured the imaginations of naive intellectuals as well as clever, self-serving politicians. The result of the Marxian triumph over good judgment (good judgment is based on all available facts, not just a biased few) has been to bring about governments that have a terrible track record for improving the human condition, let alone for understanding human nature. Unlike Nazi race theory, which has been revealed as a vile, distorted and oversimplified genetic theory of human differences, Marx's theory has yet to be sufficiently exposed as a dreary, biased, and oversimplified environmentalist theory of human nature.

As good gene/environment interactionists, we ethologists should (hopefully) have no need to worry about our discipline sliding towards oversimplifications. Our openness to the complexity of behavior and its determinants helps us avoid simple explanations. But we occasionally need reminders about our conduct when problems like Rushton's arise. As Eibl (1989) points out, the main thing for us to do when such problems arise is to remain cool and to stick to as many facts as we have about the matter at hand.

But the story for ethologists, in my estimation, does not stop here. To his great credit, Marx was right in his observation that human behavior is inextricably tied to the environment through resources. The acquisition, production and distribution of resources constitute major human activities. Today, there is no longer doubt that resource insufficiency controls a large proportion of animal social interactions. Without adequate resources, there is no survival and without the appropriate means to acquire resources, every individual is at serious risk. I develop this theme in an earlier paper (Charlesworth, 1988) in which I make two major points — one (quite obvious), that cooperative and competitive behavior are absolutely necessary for survival, development, and reproduction, and the other (less obvious) that much of cooperation is actually in the service of competition. I also stress the fact that resources and their acquisition have been grossly neglected in studies of human behavior.

In 1921 Wallace Craig wrote an essay entitled "Why do animals fight?" in response to current concerns at the time about the possible biological origins (and hence necessity?) of aggression. Not wanting to be drawn into any particular place on the

spectrum of genes versus environment argument, Craig gave the advice that every good ethologist can give when such questions are asked — "To understand why an animal fights, we must watch its fighting behavior, and also study the relations of its fighting to its other behavior, to its life history — in short to its whole economy." (p. 265) Craig makes his point well: animals do not enjoy fighting for its own sake but to gain or retain resources. I think humans are no different.

Craig's point I think should be the key to our attempts to understand human social interactions. We need to expand our picture of behavior and ask new questions. If resources are critical determinants of human behavior, are differences in ethnicity, nationality, or gender really sufficient reason to take the many risks associated with acting aggressively? In our search for non-obvious causes of group aggression, should we not ask whether there is covert economic injustice at the bottom of the aggression, rather than whether it is learned or innate? My own guess is that economic injustice, (or the perception of it) is at the basis of the majority of human conflicts.

Being endowed with superb cognitive powers, humans are quick at acquiring knowledge and using it to satisfy their own needs — even if the knowledge is incomplete. Like prejudices against people, prejudices against or for theories are usually based on incomplete knowledge. As anyone else, we ethologists have our prejudices. But in our research we can reduce them by striving for the ancient ethological ideal. That's right, by aiming for the whole picture — for what the oldtimer calls ethograms. With them (or at least our best approximations to them) we will be more responsible in providing society with knowledge of human behavior.

References:

Charlesworth, W.R. (1988). Resources and resource acquisition during ontogeny, In Kevin MacDonald (Ed.) *Sociobiological perspectives on human development*. NY: Springer Verlag, 24-77.

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Grammer, K. & Stockl, M. (1989), Human ethology: r/K selection and the "New Racism", *Human Ethology Newsletter*, 5 (12), 2-4.

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MacDonald, K. (1988). *Social and personality development: An evolutionary synthesis*. NY: Plenum Press.

Comments on differential K Theory

by: Irwin Silverman, Department of Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada.

Rushton's attempt to explain human race differences data in terms of "Differential K Theory" falters on the basis of it's misguided premises regarding the hypothesized relationships of the r/K dimension with "intelligence," "rule-following," and "sexual restraint."

The rationale for intelligence is based on the notion of a phylogenetic trend toward K associated with vertebrate special-

ization. This kind of reasoning underscores the fallacy of evolutionary hierarchies, which violate the precepts of natural selection and obscure actual causal factors. The causes of r/K pertain wholly to ecological stability. Fish, for example, span the entire range of the dimension. By Rushton's *scala naturae*, this should place human intelligence somewhere between salmon and sunfish.

The inclusion of rule-following and sexual restraint show similar disregard for ecological determinants and for the nature of the differences between r and K lifestyles. K-selected animals remain in the same habitat and compete against each other for limited resources. Hence, kinship networks develop in the service of individual competitive positions. The ecological demands upon r-strategists require that they form more transient groupings, such as herds or schools, but these are not, as Rushton suggests, social anarchies. Rules, in the form of dominance hierarchies, territorial arrangements, courtship rituals, mating systems, etc., are basic to both aggregates. Similarly, it is implausible to assert that r-selected animals manifest less sexual restraint than their K counterparts. They copulate on a different schedule, one that is more adaptive for unstable ecological conditions, thus reproducing more copiously over fewer mating periods.

The furor over Rushton's theory, however, seems to stem more from its social implications than its conceptual problems. In fact, some colleagues have suggested that it may behoove us to eschew the principle of free academic inquiry in this case in deference to some alleged greater good. They should be reminded that a worthy principle must survive its most difficult tests. Otherwise, it is not a principle.

Response to S. Neill

by: Irwin Silverman, Department of Psychology, York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada.

In the December, 1989, *Newsletter*, S. Neill states that my explanation of reproductive differences among races in terms of male-male reproductive competition, is "as uncontaminated by evidence as that advanced by Rushton." It would have been pointless of me to propose an alternative theory unless it could account for additional data. In my Edinburgh presentation, I summarized several sources of data on race differences in sexual dimorphism, which supported my interpretation. I described, also, hypotheses based on the theory regarding differences in the ratio of male to female reproductive success, for which data were probably accessible but not presently available.

Neill's position seems to be that satisfactory evidence for either explanation must directly reveal the presumed ecological conditions of the ancestral populations in question. This is not an uncommon mode of criticism of evolutionary-based theories, but it is epistemologically misguided. A theory is a heuristic, the value of which resides in the extent and magnitude of the hypotheses it provides. Paleontological or ecological data bearing on the reproductive competition theory would be most useful, but it would not minimize the significance of the evidence at hand.

REGISTRATION FORM

1990 Annual Meetings - Animal Behavior Society
10-15 June 1990, State University of New York at Binghamton

Name _____ Female Male
(Last) (First) (Middle)

Name for Name Tag _____

Department _____

Institution _____

Mailing Address _____

City/State/Zip _____

Telephone (Work) () _____ (Home) () _____

Names of Other Adults Attending _____

Names and Ages of Children Attending _____

N.B. Please check here for registration information for Campus Preschool (ages 2-5) _____, and/or for information on in-home child care or amusement programs _____. The Preschool will take children on a first come, first serve basis, and will require a \$20 deposit. So, please plan to register them early.

Registration Fee

	ABS Member	Student Member	Non-Member	Guest/Spouse
Advance Registration - by 1 April	<input type="checkbox"/> \$60	<input type="checkbox"/> \$30	<input type="checkbox"/> \$75	<input type="checkbox"/> \$30
Late Registration - after 1 April	<input type="checkbox"/> \$70	<input type="checkbox"/> \$35	<input type="checkbox"/> \$85	<input type="checkbox"/> \$35
On-Site Registration	<input type="checkbox"/> \$80	<input type="checkbox"/> \$40	<input type="checkbox"/> \$95	<input type="checkbox"/> \$40
Registration subtotal: \$ _____				

Meals - Indicate the number of each meal desired.

	Breakfast	Lunch	Dinner	
Sunday, 10 June	NA	()	NA	
Monday, 11 June	()	()	()	Thursday (14 June)
Tuesday, 12 June	()	()	()	Banquet Menu Choice
Wednesday, 13 June	()	()	()	Menu 1 (Chicken)
Thursday, 14 June	()	()	N/A	Menu 2 (Stuffed
Friday, 15 June	()	()	()	Eggplant)
Saturday, 16 June	()	NA	N/A	

Breakfasts x \$3.20	= \$ _____
Lunches x \$5.05	= \$ _____
Dinners x \$6.35	= \$ _____
Sunday Picnic x \$7.50	= \$ _____
Thursday Banquet x \$14.00	= \$ _____
Saturday 16th Breakfast x \$3.00	= \$ _____
Meals Subtotal: \$ _____	

Housing

We encourage all guests to stay in the Hinman College complex, a 2 minute walk from the lecture halls and site of the dinner hall, picnic and banquet. Rooms will be assigned as requests are received, but there is ample room for all. Rooms but not meals are available Saturday 9 June, to accommodate those using special airline fares. Restaurant information will be provided for Saturday arrivals.

Circle nights requested:

Single Room @ \$27.00 per night: June 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
 $\underline{\quad}$ (No. of nights) x $\underline{\quad}$ (No. of rooms) x \$27.00 = \$ $\underline{\quad}$

Double Room: \$17.50 per night: June 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
 $\underline{\quad}$ (No. of nights) x $\underline{\quad}$ (No. of rooms) x \$17.50 = \$ $\underline{\quad}$

Roommate's name $\underline{\quad}$
 $\underline{\quad}$ Please assign roommate. Smoking $\underline{\quad}$ Non-smoking $\underline{\quad}$ No preference $\underline{\quad}$

Linens (sheets, pillowcases, towels) can be rented for a one-time charge of \$5.00/set. Pillows and blankets are provided with the room.

$\underline{\quad}$ (No. of linen packages) x \$5.00 = \$ $\underline{\quad}$ Housing Subtotal: \$ $\underline{\quad}$

For those who prefer motels or camping, check here for information. There are a number of excellent motels within a few miles of campus. Singles range from \$29.00-\$60.00 before 1 May.

T-Shirts (Butterflies front and back! \$6.50/ea. Sizes S, M, L, XL, XXL)

T-Shirts should be ordered with Registration. They are not included with fee. They are 100% cotton and come in White, Aqua, Ecru, Mint, Pink, Silver and Peach. Size XXL costs \$1.00 more.

No. of shirts (Size/Color): $\underline{\quad}$ / $\underline{\quad}$ $\underline{\quad}$ / $\underline{\quad}$ $\underline{\quad}$ / $\underline{\quad}$ $\underline{\quad}$ / $\underline{\quad}$

$\underline{\quad}$ Total Number Shirts) x \$6.50 + \$ $\underline{\quad}$ (per XXL) = \$ $\underline{\quad}$

Optional ActivitiesCorning Glassworks and Wine Tasting Tour

(Sunday, 10 June)
 (Wednesday, 13 June)

$\underline{\quad}$ deposits x \$10.00 = \$ $\underline{\quad}$
 $\underline{\quad}$ deposits x \$10.00 = \$ $\underline{\quad}$

Cooperstown

(Tuesday, 12 June)
 (Saturday, 16 June)

$\underline{\quad}$ deposits x \$10.00 = \$ $\underline{\quad}$
 $\underline{\quad}$ deposits x \$10.00 = \$ $\underline{\quad}$

Total Optional Activities: \$ $\underline{\quad}$

Summary

Registration subtotal:	\$ $\underline{\quad}$
Housing subtotal:	\$ $\underline{\quad}$
Meals subtotal:	\$ $\underline{\quad}$
T-shirts:	\$ $\underline{\quad}$
Optional Activities:	\$ $\underline{\quad}$
GRAND TOTAL:	\$ $\underline{\quad}$

Make checks payable to "1990 ABS Meetings". Entire payment must accompany registration form. Refunds, less \$10.00 administration fee, will be made if we receive written notification of your change of plans by 1 May 1990. NO refunds will be issued after 1 May 1990, except in severe emergency.

Mail to: 1990 Animal Behavior Society Meetings
 c/o Dr. Anne B. Clark
 Department of Biological Sciences
 S.U.N.Y. Binghamton
 Binghamton, NY 13901

ISHE and its Mission

by: David Alan Munro, sometime professor of linguistics in Africa, now a retiree in Laguna Beach, California.

On the r/K-racism dispute Human Ethology certainly needs no PR service as Gail Zivin suggests in the December 1989 issue of the Newsletter. That's for the likes of Ivan Boesky and other miscreants.

What Human Ethology does need is a "social implications wing," the equivalent of "Spissy"—big psych's Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues. Here we are behindhand.

Take imprinting and education. It is now many years since Chomsky and his friend Eric Lenneberg asserted the biological basis of human language and the rigorous operation of an imprinting mechanism in its acquisition. Obviously this raises the question of what the young human contributes to the acquisition of the entire range of what Chomsky calls "species specific behaviors" and learnings. Yet a casual review I made of the last several years of *Educational Psychology* revealed no research at all in this controlling aspect of early education.

Take paleontology. Louis Leakey and the other able diggers-up of our past seem reluctant to use the nature of man as is as a research tool to find out how he got that way. But we remember, two-thirds of Darwin's famed *Descent of Man* (1871) was the section "Sexual Selection." At some point in our past, faster-talkers began getting more girls pregnant; at some point in inter-tribal warfare — which Eibl has been at pains to show is in our nature — girls and women became part of the booty, to be impregnated by the victors. In fact, as we all know, a sharp change in the estrous cycle produced continuous sex receptivity in the human female and transferred the sex initiative from the female to the male. Surely this "ethological" factor explains our startling rise (in brain power) *after* we ceased the evolutionary competition with other animals and *during* our competition man vs. man.

I could go on, but you get the idea. Human ethology, like other social sciences, is engaged in pushing back our ignorance about ourselves, and, to the extent that its findings are valid, they should be useful in the better ordering of our lives.

Isn't that what we do here?

BOOK REVIEWS

Human Ethology.

New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989. £50. ISBN 0-202-02030-4. Pp. xv + 848. By Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt.

Reviewed by Tom K. Pitcairn.
Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, Scotland.

A Book for all Seasons.

The first thing to say about this book is that it is enormous, in size, scope and price. So much so that the present reviewer did not really know where to start (the review, not the book, although indeed the pure size of the task will mean that most readers will inevitably dip into the various sections independently). So, to the description first of all.

The book is divided into ten sections ranging from basic

concepts in ethology through social behaviour communication and ontogeny, to a consideration of aesthetics and ethics. The fifty chapters take up over seven hundred pages of closely (but clearly) printed text, and the references an additional sixty-eight pages — a mammoth undertaking both to write and to read. Is it worth the effort?

I think the general answer must be yes. I remember, as a Zoology undergraduate in the 1960's, being introduced to the recently published work by W.C. Wynne-Edwards (*Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour*) with the words: "It may not be correct, but it contains a hell of a lot of Zoology!" I feel much the same way about this text — "No one who aspires to understand human behaviour can fail to have mastered — not merely to have read, but mastered — the contents of this book," to quote the review of it by Melvin Konner printed on the dust jacket. This does not mean that each section represents a consensus of opinion in a particular area, or even the 'state of the art' text. Rather that in each section the range of material presented and the way in which it is handled allows the reader to enter into new areas of knowledge with which s/he is not familiar with the confidence that they will not be led entirely astray. This is surely the primary function of a text book.

This is a translation of the German version which is now, I think, in its second edition. Each edition and this translation, however, has been extensively reworked, with new material constantly being added so that the text has, like Topsy, grown. This leads inevitably to some discontinuities in the presentation, as it is virtually impossible to incorporate such new material in a seamless manner. However I think this is a small price to pay for the continual updating from new work that has been done in the field, or indeed the incorporation of material which has come to the writers attention perhaps as a result of criticisms of earlier versions.

The text is enlivened with numerous illustrations, both from the relevant literature and from the extremely wide-ranging films and photographs of the author's. Most readers of this review will be well aware of the work done in the Forschungsstelle für Humanethologie, involving the documentation of social interaction across many different cultures. One cannot fail to be impressed, however, at the range of the examples which are presented here. They include sequences of photographic stills taken from movie film of both formal ceremonies and ordinary social interaction, and also examples drawn from the analysis of cultural objects. The illustrations are very clear, and must contribute greatly to the cost of the book.

The book is dedicated to the memory of Konrad Lorenz, who died in 1989 shortly before publication (of the English edition), and the author was one of the original workers with Konrad when the Max-Planck Institute at Seewiesen was founded. Thus the text is set firmly in the traditions of German ethology, and this must always be remembered when reading it. I am not suggesting that this is in any sense a bad thing, simply that like any other school within a particular discipline a special viewpoint is presented. Indeed it can be argued that to present a strong theoretical perspective does great service to readers, for at least they are presented with something to get their teeth into, rather than be faced with a plenitude of facts with no framework. However, there are assumptions made which depend upon this perspective. A strong emphasis is laid on selection and fitness which by a degree of sleight of hand is made to encompass both "phylogenetic and cultural experience." Thus non valid at the beginning of the chapter on Rielman's Con-

tribution to Ethics that virtues of the agonistic and affiliative systems — such things as bravery and chivalry, fidelity and charity respectively — are firstly distinguishable and secondly complementary in an adaptive way. This adaptation presumably arises because selection and fitness can be determined by cultural experience.

The description of sociobiology in section 2.4 delineates this problem well. The section is a very clear exposition of sociobiological theory, which is criticized (rightly, in my view) for its lack of attention to detail in the rabid process of model building. The solution offered for the human condition is essentially a group selectionist one, in that groups operate to advantage themselves (in competition with other groups) by including and enforcing rules of altruism, loyalty and obedience. So far so good, but these group constraints are initially presented as deriving from the uniquely human ability to operate at a cognitive or conscious level. The sleight of hand comes in when these group advantageous features, themselves certainly adaptive, are extended to become features of individual selection which therefore have an innate component.

This is expressed most clearly in the section on Man and his Habitat, where the nature of society is described in terms of the contrast between man's biological adaptation to living in small groups and societal (cultural) pressure to maintain larger political organisations. These organisations themselves are subject to selection pressures which exactly parallel biological evolution. The sleight of hand comes in again at this point, for the assumption is then made that they ARE biological pressures, i.e. not only are they analogous processes but also homologous ones. This distinction is admittedly one which has troubled biology for a long time (e.g. see Wickler's chapter in Von Cranach's book, *Methods of Inference from Animal to Human Behaviour*), but becomes very important when we begin to discuss causal relationships. Thus the structures of all human society, past or present, are not only a result of evolutionary change but (the implication is) therefore rely on some sort of genetic component. For example in the Ethics chapter again, it is made clear in a discussion on Schiller versus Kant that not only must we, in Schiller's terms, unite duty with joy, but that the obligation to be faithful (dutiful) comes from a biologically inherited trait.

The problem, it seems to me, stems from a need to unpack the nature of biological traits. Mere pan-cultural occurrence is, of course, not enough and the use of deprivation experiments where acquisition methods are examined is fully explained in the chapter on Methodology. The nature of the difference between norms (i.e. frequency of occurrence) and ideals (internalised rule structures) is dealt with. And yet there is a tendency to assume that the internalised rules themselves must inevitably be species specific and innate. This can be seen in the discussion on Piaget and Kohlberg (p. 707), where a shift occurs from initial stages involving learning from parents to later stages which show internalised moral rules. These moral rules are seen as examples of the biologically pre-programmed values talked about later in the chapter on ethics. For Piaget and Kohlberg, however, these stages represented a set of cognitive changes in the child, which indeed means that the child becomes equipped with an ability to extract the underlying principles from a series of behavioural constraints. This is a very different perspective, however, from one which says that the nature of the rules themselves are specified. The difference lies in the nature of what it is that is specified. In the Piagetian canon it is the

cognitive structures, which are specified as end points of the developmental process — not the rules.

In the same way, there is a tendency within ethology and certain branches of psychology to assume that there is an indexical link between behaviour and meaning (i.e. behaviour X means Y). However, it is clear that what is important, in social behaviour at least, is not the behaviour that is seen but the interpretation that is put on it. All behaviours derive from motives within the individual — the focal point for the receivers' analysis of the situation is often their perception of the motivation for or intention of the event (the meta-intention), not the event itself. Thus the structure (in this case of perceived intentions, in the Piagetian case of the underlying conative abilities) is the driving force, not the event.

This difference is crucial, not only in the analysis described above, but also in higher level processes in human behaviour. Thus the Nazis are described (on P.708) as a group that were pathological because they exaggerated certain individual components of behavior, namely courage and obedience, leading to a loss of charity and humanity. On the contrary, however, what I find interesting in such movements is precisely that they maintained what we would consider to be the normal virtues (of loyalty, helping others, obedience, caring), but that the groups to which these were applicable were restricted. Outsiders (Jews, Bolsheviks, Poles etc.) were considered to be beyond the pale, to be Untermensch. This means that it is not individual components of behaviour which were distorted, but the structure to which they were applied. It should be clear that I am talking here about the "average" Nazi party supporter, not those exhibiting obvious pathologies, who were able to exploit them by being put into positions of terrible power. In other words many different groups show exaggerated loyalty (armed forces, for example), and the individual is often close to dehumanising others (racism as an obvious example). It is only when these "normal" parts of our behaviour become institutionalised in a system which exploits these fallibilities as structural components that such events as Germany in the 1930's can occur.

This criticism of some of the tenets expressed in this book are really intended to act as a starting point for discussion, not to reduce its value. On the contrary, as I have already said, the strong theoretical position is one of its good points. This is a mammoth undertaking extremely well constructed which should be read by anyone who professes an interest in human behaviour, from historian to psychiatrist, judge to politician, as well as those who are more directly involved in the field of human ethology.

Human Ethology.

New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989. £50. ISBN 0-202-02030-4. Pp. xv + 848. By Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt.

Reviewed by Bradley Jesness.
6800 Wakefield Dr. S., Eden Prairie, Minnesota 55346, U.S.A.

I commend and congratulate Professor Dr. Eibl-Eibesfeldt on what seems to be another great work. It is in many ways an appropriate sequel and extension of his other great work, *Ethology, the Biology of Behavior*. The new text promises to be a classic, invaluable text on human social behaviors and adaptations. But, as is true among psychologists, there seem to be those with interests in social behavior and those interested in

cognitive processes and cognitive development and these seem to be fundamentally different (or at least separate) perspectives on Man. E-E is the master of human social ethology, in my view. He is a great classical ethologist, but he (like American psychologists) is only of one of the two fundamental persuasions. I, in contrast, take the other basic perspective.

Of course humans, while most highly social, must still understand things and function by an large for themselves. True, our social relationships allow us to specialize and do just one type of work or another, but with that we have our own separate representations of the world and our own thoughts. These, like social behaviors, are rooted in, innate action patterns. Cognitive processes, moreover, no doubt accrue more and more rooted in and based on further (emerging) innate perceptual/response biases during ontogeny. It is likely for this reason most cognitive developmental psychologists can see stages (during development) as real, and do not view them as arbitrarily specified for convenience. As I have indicated in my papers (e.g. "An Ethological Conceptualization of Learning," in the Newsletter, Sept. 1987), this outlook on stages fits well with the growing understanding of human memory. This brings me to my point. Those doing basic research, like those investigating memory (work largely done by "information-processing" researchers now) and those looking for signs of cognitive developments and trying to define the nature of such things would profit greatly from using a classical ethological approach. Unfortunately this is not encouraged as much as it should be by E-E's text. The great professor seems to pretend his book is more than it is. With the title, his introduction, and the beginning chapters he indicates his text is a comprehensive introduction to human ethology. I see it as very skewed. Those doing basic research in developmental psychology, noted above, are likely to continue in the same way they have and the progress of these groups is likely to slow due to an over-emphasis on a hypothetic-deductive (vs an inductive) approach (as is common in psychology in general).

Unfortunately, an understanding of the essentials of ethology is very, very rare indeed among psychologists (in my experience, non-existent). Those who claim to understand this science do little different in the way they define factors or variables of interest, showing with that no real understanding. Ethology, when truly applied to human behavior, results in such a fundamental shift in methods and defining variables that it amounts to a scientific revolution (what Kuhn has called a paradigm shift). E-E is a major figure in this revolution. He and some others have shed much light on social behaviors and emotion and their work promises more and more. Unfortunately, little is available in way of a translation (or transposition) of the terms of classical ethology for the purposes of investigating cognitive developments and few ideas on how ethology might specifically be applied to this area. Now, with the way E-E begins his new text and then with an examination of the contents of the chapters that follow, we get the idea that ethology is largely for understanding babies, social life, and social phenomenon. I would have entitled the new text *Human Ethology, Volume 1: Social Adaptation*. Volume 2, on the ontogeny of basic capacities would, hopefully, still be forthcoming. Central in this would be the development of representation, basic cognitive ethology. This gives a basis for more refined social relations and adaptation as the organism matures and generally would show how the biological unit takes care of

itself. Needless to say, I do not think E-E's tiny section on behavioral development (ontogeny) suffices.

At least in U.S., I know of no ethologist who is also a cognitive developmental psychologist. It seems psychologists are not ethologists and as far as much major basic research is concerned ethologists are not psychologists. Among those most notable doing basic developmental research are the cognitive developmentalists. Arguably, the richest data and most basic, detailed yet central findings are associated with the work of Jean Piaget and those who followed him. These are both the most robust and general findings in all developmental psychology and have many implications. With ethology this approach would provide endless opportunities for the advancement of our knowledge of the basics of development and the myriad ramifications. Already modern neo-Piagetians have embraced the findings on short-term memory and long-term memory and have examined the nature of "working memory." (These findings may well be the other major set of robust, significant central data in developmental psychology.) For rapid, sustained and continuous progress, I am confident that all that is needed in basic cognitive developmental research is ethology. In my view it is absolutely necessary to have a merging of the two perspectives. I wish professor Eibl-Eibesfeldt had done much more to encourage this. I believe that while encouraging classical, ethological research in some major areas of psychology, progress in understanding all aspects of human behavior will be slower than it might have been, if E-E was clearer about the extent of his work and more mindful of psychology in general. Many view questions about human representation and cognition as central and see the need for the highest quality research in this area.

CURRENT LITERATURE

Material for this section of the newsletter should be sent directly to the editor. A sentence or two of summary would increase the value to readers.

Hershberger, W.A. (Ed.) (1989). *Volitional action: Conation and Control*. New York: Elsevier.

During the last several decades the behavioral sciences have been undergoing what is arguably a Kuhnian scientific revolution, with radical behaviorism giving way to considerations of cognition and conation. Although cognition is perhaps the more familiar of these two terms, conation (concerning the inclination to act purposefully) is equally a hallmark of the times. Indeed, the past few years has been a resurgence of interest in the psychology and physiology of volition that is unparalleled in this century. Not since William James published his *Principles of psychology* in 1890 has so much careful attention been devoted to a consideration of *the will*.

The present book comprises a significant sample, or distillation, of the observations, both rational and empirical, of individuals from diverse disciplines who are contributing to the present renaissance in conation. The book was designed to serve a threefold purpose: (a) to consolidate the gains of the various scholars, relatively isolated in their respective disciplines, (b) to foster and help focus future research on conation and self-control, and (c) to provide practitioners in applied psychology with a broad based ...

torial.

William James noted that there are two fundamental things to be understood about voluntary action: First, volitional actions, being desired and intended beforehand, are done with full prevision; that is, they are preceded by anticipatory images defining what those actions are to be. Secondly, these anticipatory images are representations of the intended sensory consequences of the necessary muscular innervation and not representations of the muscular innervation itself. (James' putative image is not to be confused with Von Holst and Mittelstaedt's efference copy.) The theoretical flavor of the book is largely cybernetic or control theoretic. That is, most of the authors are committed to the proposition that voluntary actions are intentional, self-controlled inputs or sensations (including, in some cases, the sensed corollary discharges of efference), just as James implied. The principal champion of this notion today is William Powers (see Chapters 2 & 13), who used the idea as the title of his influential 1973 book, *Behavior: the control of perception*.

William James also noted that the sensory consequences which define a particular voluntary action may be resident or remote. Sensations arising from muscle spindles are resident sensations; those arising from exteroceptors are remote. A person driving an automobile, for example, is controlling the remote visual consequences of his or her effector activity. The driver is also controlling his or her destination, another remote sensory consequence. Some of the authors, particularly those with a psychological or sociological perspective (e.g., Hyland) are concerned primarily with the control of remote sensory consequences, whereas other, particularly those with a physiological perspective (e.g., Pavloski), focus more upon resident sensory effects. This, of course, is as it should be. The two perspectives are complementary.

Volition is a phenomenon of immense practical as well as theoretical significance, and several chapters (e.g., Lord & Kerman) address the applied aspect. Professional psychology is in need of a broader scientific foundation than that provided by 20th century behaviorism. Conative science is a veritable cornerstone for such a new scientific foundation. (Wayne A. Hershberger, Dept. of Psychology, Northern Illinois Un., DeKalb, Illinois 60115, U.S.A.)

Kofoed L., MacMillan J. (1989). Darwinian Evolution of Social Behavior: Implications for Group Psychotherapy. *Psychiatry*, 52, 475-481. Paper explores application of reciprocation theory to group psychotherapy. (Psychiatry Service 116A, VA Medical Center, White River Jct., VT 05001, USA).

Schino, G. & Aureli, F. (1989). Do men yawn more than women? *Ethology and Sociobiology*, 10, 375-378. (The aim of the study was to test the hypothesis that sex differences in primate yawning are related to size dimorphism in canine teeth. Unlike more dimorphic primates, human males and females did not differ in the frequency of yawning, although uncovered yawns were more frequent in men than in women). (Istit. Psicologia CNR, Departo di Psicologia Comparata, via Ulisse Aldrovandi 16b, 00197 Roma, Italy; and Dept. of Comparative Physiology, Univ. Utrecht, P.O. Box 80086, 3508 TB Utrecht, The Netherlands).

BULLETIN BOARD

Announcements

The Human Behavior and Evolution Society second Annual Meeting, University of California, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, California, August 16-19, 1990

Call for Papers

Abstracts of proposed presentations are due by April 1, 1990. Decisions on the program will be made by May 1, 1990. Please use the top half of 8 1/2" x 11" paper with 1" margins. Please use the first line for the title, the second for the author(s), and subsequent lines for affiliations and a mailing address. The abstract should not exceed 200 words (not including titles, names, etc.). Abstracts will be considered for both lecture and poster formats. Mail abstracts to Dr. Michael T. McGuire (address below). Symposia on interdisciplinary topics are encouraged. Please contact either Program Co-Chair immediately to discuss your proposed symposia. The Program Co-Chairs are Robert Boyd (213) 206-8008 and Joan B. Silk (213) 825-2655.

Award for Best paper by Young Investigator

This year we introduce an award for the best paper by a young investigator. To be eligible one must be currently registered as a graduate student or within 5 years of having received the doctorate degree. The student must be the first author on the paper. Papers must be submitted in final draft by April 1, 1990 on 8 1/2" x 11" paper, double-spaced. Selected papers will be presented at the meeting. Papers will be judged by a panel of society officers and members, with a monetary cash prize awarded to the winner.

Registration

The registration fee is \$55 for members, \$65 for non-members if received by April 1, and \$75 for members and non-members thereafter. The registration fee is reduced by 50% for students and postdoctoral fellows. All participants must pay the full registration fee, even if attending only part of the meeting. Please complete the attached Registration Form and return with your check. Checks should be made out to "The Human Behavior and Evolution Society." Forms and checks should be mailed to Dr. Michael T. McGuire (address below). Early responses would be appreciated to facilitate planning. If you would be interested in our exploring the possibilities for child care, please check the appropriate line on the registration form. Registration fees are fully refundable for cancellations before July 16th; after that a 50% refund applies.

Lodging and Meal information will be sent upon receipt of the registration fee. We have reserved student residential suite space on the UCLA Campus ranging from:

\$41.00/person/night if the suite is occupied by 4 persons
\$48.00/person/night if the suite is occupied by 3 persons
\$66.00/person/night if the suite is occupied by 2 persons
\$97.00/person/night if the suite is occupied by 1 person.

The residential suites are spacious two-bedroom suites with two-twin beds in each room, living room and private bath. The above rates are based on the American Plan (room, breakfast, lunch, dinner), and daily maid service. Hotel and motel accom-

modations are available off-campus, but are beyond comfortable walking distance, and the rates are considerably higher.

Please send registration fees, abstracts or student papers to:
Michael T. McGuire, M.D.

THE HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND EVOLUTION
SOCIETY
UCLA Neuropsychiatric Institute & Hospital
760 Westwood Plaza, Box 33
Los Angeles, CA 90024-1759
(213) 825-0705

Call for Book Reviewers

We are again in need of English language reviewers for books. If you might be interested, please write to William Bailey, Psychology Dept., Eastern Illinois University, Charleston, IL 61920. If you would like to review a particular book, we can probably get a review copy for you. If you have no preference, we'll send you one that we get — after inquiring about your desires of course.

Bibliography Project

Director: Prof. H.P. Caton, D.Litt.

Associates: Dr. J.M.G. van der Dennen (Groningen). Frank K. Salter (Brisbane)

Sponsors: International Society for Human Ethology, European Sociobiological Society, Association for Politics & the Life Sciences

Griffith University / Brisbane 4111 / Australia

January 1990

Dear Colleague,

This is to invite your participation in a project for the compilation of a Bibliography of Human Behavior.

The Bibliography is an upgrade of the *Bibliography of Biosocial Science: 2500 Titles Across Fourteen Fields* (1988), published by Frank K. Salter and myself. The objective is to collect titles from numerous disciplines in which human behavior is researched according to methods of the biological sciences. Some main fields to be covered are Human Evolution, Cultural Evolution (including Prehistory), Human Biology, Ethology, Sociobiology, Biological Anthropology, Social Psychology, Political Science, Experimental Psychology (learning theory), Endocrinology, Brain Sciences, and Psychopathology. The bibliography will have a Name and Subject index.

The editors will endeavor to select publications significant for their data, analysis, methodological refinement, and their relevance to understanding human behavior.

The bibliography is data based on Pro-Cite. It is expected that the published bibliography will be available in book form and on disk.

Because of the bibliography's broad scope, standard methods of title search are being augmented by direct solicitation of titles. The purpose of this letter is to invite you to send the Project your bibliography, in hard copy. If you elect to do so, please organize it as follows:

- Place your ten most significant publications at the beginning of the list.

- Write journal titles out in full. For books, please indicate both the publisher's name and place of publication.
- After each title, enter three key words for use in the subject index.
- Titles published after 1980 are preferred. Pre-1980 titles should be particularly significant.
- Include "in press" publications.

The estimated duration of the project is two years. To facilitate inputting, please submit at your earliest convenience. You are invited to submit a supplementary list eighteen months hence.

You are also invited to send off-prints of five publications. These publications will be deposited in a special collection.

Receipt of bibliographies and off-prints will be acknowledged by *surface mail* postcard or by Bitnet.

Final editing of the title lists will be done by Section Editors experienced in the field they edit.

You can assist our efforts by passing on this letter to colleagues. Comments and suggestions about the bibliography's concept or plan of implementation are welcome.

Yours truly,
Hiram Caton
Project Director

Send title lists to:

Manager
Bibliography Project
Griffith University
Brisbane 4111, Australia
E-Mail humcaton@pegasus.itc.gu.oz.au

A New Journal

HUMAN NATURE, an interdisciplinary biosocial perspective. Jane B. Lancaster (*University of New Mexico*), *Editor*.

Aims and Scope

In research and in education, the social, behavioral, and biological sciences have traditionally pursued separate paths. Yet it is increasingly apparent that the most pervasive and crucial issues of our time lie squarely at the interface of these artificially-separated disciplines. These issues present themselves at both global and national levels. At the global level, humanity finds itself confronted with massive assaults on the evolved ecosystems of the Earth in the forms of overpopulation, pollution of land, air, and water, destruction of soil and vegetation, global warming, regional famine, and the continuing threat of major sociopolitical conflicts. While at the national level, societies struggle with an unemployed urban underclass, runaway increases in crime, substance abuse, single-parenthood, teenage parenthood, unemployment, homelessness, and the feminization of poverty. Although these problems appear in myriad form, they belong to a single interrelated complex at the heart of which is human behavior and nature itself. To address these problems, we must first understand the very substance of our species including how we evolved to be the way we are, why we behave the way we do, and the social and ecological contexts that restrain, channel, modify, and diversify our behavior. These problems must be addressed through understanding the expression of human nature in human behavior. Their solutions will

be the challenge of the twenty-first century. Whether our species can successfully meet them will set the future of both humanity and the planet.

Human Nature is dedicated to advancing the interdisciplinary investigation of the biological, social, and environmental factors that underlie human behavior. It focuses primarily on the functional unity in which these factors are continuously and mutually interactive, including: evolutionary, biological, and sociological processes as they interact with human social behavior; biological and demographic consequences of human history; cross-cultural, cross-species, and historical perspectives of human behavior; and the relevance of a biosocial perspective to scientific, social, and policy issues.

The journal features peer-reviewed overviews and statements of biosocial interpretation and research as well as news briefs highlighting recent conferences and research reports.

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If the date on your mailing label is earlier than the current year, it is time to renew your membership. Renewal notices are not sent for economic reasons. No more than two warnings are given on the mailing label. Thereafter you are removed from the membership list.

Membership dues are U.S. \$20.00 (f40,00 guilders) per year (students U.S. \$10.00) and U.S. \$50.00 (f100,00 guilders) per 3 years. The library rate is twice these amounts.

Directions for payment are given on the last page of this newsletter. Payment reaching the treasurer before February 1, May 1, August 1 or November 1, will be processed in time for indication on the mailing label of the next newsletter issue.

Please, report any errors, changes of address, etc. to the editor.

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INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR HUMAN ETHOLOGY

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The ISHE was formed with the goal of promoting ethological perspectives on the study of human behaviour. It encourages empirical research that addresses the questions of individual development, environmental, ecological and social processes which elicit and support certain behavior patterns, the function and significance of behavior, and comparative and evolutionary problems. The Society has elected officers and a number of committees, publishes a quarterly Newsletter, collates an annual selection of human ethology abstracts, and meets annually, either independently or in conjunction with the Animal Behavior Society, the International Primatological Society or another major society.

YES, I WANT TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR HUMAN ETHOLOGY

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Annual Membership Dues are \$20.00 U.S. (students \$10.00), including a subscription to the quarterly *Human Ethology Newsletter*. Preferably you pay once every three years at the reduced rate of \$50.00. You may also wish to recommend that your library subscribe. The library rate is \$40.00 per year or \$100.00 for three years.

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Dr. Glenn Weisfeld, 1989
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